Being-in-the-world

“Dasein" translates as "being-there". So, according to Heidegger, before anything else we exist, we are "there", we are in the world and that is how we should conceive ourselves if we are going to understand our lives. To stress the importance of this existence, Heidegger gave to Dasein’s activity of existing, the term being-in-the-world.
The use of the hyphens emphasizes that there is no distance between ourselves and the world. We are as much a part of that world as it is part of us. The "in" is precisely an indicator of involvement, Heidegger thought that no distance, either physical or mental, should exist between ourselves and the world. Dasein’s interest and involvement with its world is intrinsic to Dasein. There is no existing, no "being-there", without a world in which to exist. A person without a world makes no sense. The world and Dasein are one and the same.”

Because Heidegger is dealing with what he deems a “fundamental ontology” in his work "Being and Time", he has chosen to stray from the terms ‘human being’, ‘humanity’, etc. This is done in order that he may set forth a structurally sound ontological assessment of Being while not trapping the phenomena of Being under an inadequate title. “Dasein” is the term designated for ‘that being for which being is a concern’. Or more precisely, “Dasein” signifies, as literally translated from the German text, either “Being-here” or “Being-there”. Because of Dasein’s radical temporality, its Being-here is always its Being-there. In other words, we are constantly projected into the future and are called to choose from our ownmost possibilities of our future. Dasein is ‘here’ in its own ‘present time’, but Dasein is also ‘there’ because it is a “Being-towards-death”. We are existing—literally “standing out”—in a mode of being where we are able to come face to face with our ownmost death.

Each Dasein must face his own death. This death is a truly individuating factor of each Dasein. As Heidegger phrases it, “as a potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” . Death is an event that Heidegger terms as “distinctly impending” for each Dasein. There are many things in the world that may be considered as impending upon our existence, but the distinctness of death is that Dasein cannot flee from it or have some other Dasein “die his death” for him.

It is in the face of our ownmost death that we are able to see our ownmost possibilities. “Being-towards-death”, when experienced as such, is what allows Dasein to realize his ownmost possibilities of his future, and resolutely choose his own authenticity. In the face of our ownmost death, we are then able to realize that we exist and that we can choose to exist authentically, and we are freed from the burdens of everyday modes of being. The anxiety that Dasein may experience through Being-towards-death is a moment when Dasein is brought out of his everyday existence, or brought out of what Heidegger calls the “they-self”. The “they” signifies everyone, yet no one in particular. Dasein is, for the most part, lost in the world of the “they” and is under the dictatorship of the “they”. “They say this and that”; this is precisely why Dasein is not its authentic self until it is called out of the “they” and into the anxiety of Being-towards-death. Being-towards-death offers Dasein the possibility of being individuated from the dictates of the “they”.

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death. Here we may see an emphatic affirmation of being in the face of Nothing. Heidegger states that this Being-towards-death is an “impassioned freedom”. It is the void of death which brings to us the potential of realizing the possibility of a full and authentic existence. By coming face to face with death, Dasein is able to see its lostness within the “they”, and is consequently able to freely choose his own authentic existence. This is a radical freedom that, for Heidegger, is not experienced daily and, in fact, may never be experience by some because many choose to flee from this anxious state of Being-towards-death. This is a radical realization of the utter freedom that each Dasein may become through the resolute choice in the face of his ownmost death.

Here too, as with Nietzsche, Heidegger phrases this phenomena using a statement of being. He states that Dasein is faced with the possibility of “being itself”. Because we are radically temporal, we are constantly “Being-towards-death”, and we are able to anxiously come face to face with this Nothingness and experience that we do indeed ex-ist. As the word “exist” etymologically denotes, we are literally “standing-out”. We are standing-out towards our ownmost possibilities for ourselves because we are also Being-towards-death.

Heidegger calls the human being "Dasein" (being-here.) This is again an ordinary colloquial German word. "Das menschliche Dasein" means something like "the human condition" or "being human." As with Befindlichkeit, Heidegger uses all the allusions of the colloquial form, both of "being" and of "here."
Humans are not at all some things among others, as dead bodies might be. Humans are being-here, they are in a self-locating sense. A stone can be here for me, but not for itself. This "here" is in the world, in situations, and situations are always with-others.

When Heidegger discusses Dasein, he is not discussing only humans, but also everything else that is-for humans, or is accessible to humans. It lies in the nature of the human way of being that other beings are in relation to it. The stone may lie on the table, but the stone's kind of being is not an openness to something it lies on. A human observer positions stone and table in relation to each other in space and dynamics, but their being doesn't do that.

Therefore, how anything is studied in any science depends first upon the nature of humans as open to access to . . . whatever is studied. Mathematics is not just there, its units and series have to be constituted by Dasein. Physics isn't just there, human observation and measurement are certain specific modes of how humans areas generating time and space and things. The basic ontological structure of Dasein therefore alters how we basically conceive of anything else, if we first consider that structure of Dasein.

A tendency toward "seeing" that belongs to everydayness. A peculiar way of letting the world be encountered in perception. Daseing lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world; in this kind of Being, it concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world and rid of its Being alongside that which, in the closest everyday manner, is ready-to-hand. A seeing not in order to understand, but just in order to see. Curiosity seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters -- distraction -- never dwelling anywhere -- everywhere and nowhere.

Everyday Being-with maintains itself between two extremes of positive solicitude: Solicitude can leap ahead of the other; pertains not to a "what" with which his is concerned, not to take away his 'care,' but to give it back to him authentically. Solicitude can be characterized by distance, reserve and mistrust; or, other the other hand, by a devoting Mitdasein to the same affair in common, in which Mitdasein becomes authentically bound together, and frees the Other in his freedom for himself.

What is threatening is 'nowhere.' What oppresses is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that this to say, it is the world itself. The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Dasein is anxious about its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Here the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially self-same in such a way that in the latter the world has been disclosed as world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a potentialty-for-Being which is individualized, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distincteve state-of-mind has become a theme for interpretation.

What Kant proves is that entities which are changing and entities which are permanent are necessarily present-at-hand together. But when two things which are present-at-hand are thus put on the same level, this does not as yet mean that subject and Object are present-at-hand togehter. And even if this were proved, what is ontological decisive would still be covered up -- namely, the basic state of the 'subject', Dasein, as Being-in-the-world. The Being-present-at-hand together of the physical and the psychical is completely different ontically and ontologically from the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world.

The Essence of Freedom

However, indication of the essential connection between truth as correctness and freedom uproots those preconceptions — granted of course that we are prepared for a transformation of thinking. Consideration of the essential connection between truth and freedom leads us to pursue the question of the essence of man in a regard which assures us an experience of a concealed essential ground of man (of Dasein), and in such a manner that the experience transposes us in advance into the originally essential domain of truth. But here it becomes evident also that freedom is the ground of the inner possibility of correctness only because it receives its own essence from the more original essence of uniquely essential truth. Freedom was first determined as freedom for what is opened up in an open region. How is this essence of freedom to be thought? That which is opened up, that to which a presentative statement as correct corresponds, are beings opened up in an open comportment. Freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be.

According to Heidegger, I or the subject has its meaning in "Being-already-in-the-world and in "Being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand-within-the-world" because I or the subject must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality-for-Being; so, the subject is the basis of care and selfhood is possible in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as Care. (14) Heidegger defines the subject or subjectum (in the traditional sense) in terms of care and authentic potentiality-for-Being. This definition of the subject has the primordial, existential. and ontological basis for the question of the subject and its distinction from its object.

Who am "I"?

The relationship between the subject and the object is interpreted as Bild, as view, as picture. This relation dissimulates the truth as unconcealment. Therefore, Heidegger's destruction of the "cogito" is the destruction of the age to which it belongs. The "I am" is forgotten in Descartes' philosophy. It has to be unconcealed from its ontological roots. In this sense, the retrieval of the "cogito" is possible only in an hermeneutical description of the "I am" which mean Being-in-the-world. Ricoeur concludes his critique of Heidegger's destruction of Descartes' understanding of "cogito sum" that the destruction of the 'cogito' as an absolute subject is the reversal of an hermeneutics of the "I am" as constituted by its relation to Being.

Furthermore, Ricoeur asserts that Heidegger inquires into the "I am" rather that "I think" because Heidegger says that "...which we, the inquirer, are ourselves... This entity which ... each of us is himself and which includes inquiring of one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'." Ricoeur claims that the opposition to the "cogito" in philosophy becomes more subtle since the question of Dasein has a certain priority in the question of Being. Furthermore, "the assertion of the 'cogito sum' proceeds from an essential omission -of an ontology of Dasein" becomes "what Descartes left undetermined...more precisely, the meaning of the being of the 'sum''." Therefore, Heidegger thinks that Descartes not only neglects the question of the being, but also fails to raise the question of the meaning of Being.

Time has a fundamental ontological function if Being is understood in the light of a temporal horizon. Heidegger gives a definition of time in terms of existential-ontological structure. His understanding of time is not related to those traditional philosophical conceptions which seem to be based on the Aristotle's definition of time as "the measure of motion according to the before and after" (35) which is a perfect formulation of common sense experience of time. In this sense, everyday Dasein finds itself a natural system of measurement in the world of everyday concern. This is a public time or common sense of time that is called the mundane time or worldly time. The mundane time is not fundamental but depends on the ontological structure of Dasein as Care for its very possibility. However, in the traditional definition of time, the ontological structure of the ecstatic care has been forgotten or ignored.

Dasein ‘has a past’ not by being located at the expanding edge of a field of ‘facts’ with which it entertains ‘relations’ (prehensions), which makes the past external and the present related to it in a time-like way (i.e., as ‘coming after’ it, in sequence with it), but by itself ecstatically opening the very ‘having-been-ness’ (Gewesenheit. corresponding to Anwesenheit) in which such things as ‘distance in time’ and ‘past facts’ are discoverable. Dasein is its own having-been-ness, which Heidegger tries to bring out with his treatment of ‘repetition.’ As ‘having a past, Dasein comes ecstatically vor ihm selbst, ‘before itself’ in the double sense of ‘face to face with itself’ and ‘already there.’ In line with Sein und Zeit’s general thesis, it is only as possible that so-called ‘past facts’ enter into an authentic disclosedness of Dasein, for Dasein is in general a possibility of itself. Hence it is wholly consistent of Heidegger to propose as authentic interpretations of, say, Presocratic philosophy what seem at first to be wholly novel assertions.6 The seeming voluntarism, not to say willfulness of Heidegger’s treatment of history may not commend his philosophy to our objectivist-empiricist temper, but it is clearly reflected in his analysis in principle of Dasein’s authentic having-been-ness and makes a resounding contrast with Mason/Whitehead.

Dasein’s intentional activity as Being-in-the-world is first disclosed in its "circumspective concern" for entities within-the-world. That is to say that Dasein first encounters these entities not merely as present-at-hand, but as ready-to-hand or as having a function. Dasein thus engages its world with a purposive, or what Heidegger calls an "in-order-to," character (SZ 352-55). The purposiveness which is manifested at the level of Dasein’s ontic relations with other entities is also reflected at the ontological level, where, as we have insisted, primordial temporality is said to be the meaning of Dasein’s Being. And "meaning" is, for Heidegger, a teleological concept.9 An entity does not receive its meaning from intellectual concepts or from ostensive referents within-the-world. The meaning of an entity lies within it, but signifies its "Whereunto. (SZ 324). This is what is primarily at issue in the contention that, although the temporal ecstasies are equiprimordial, the future has preeminence (SZ 329). The running-forward, even toward my own most particular and most extreme possibility, is neither "free-floating" nor is it sheer recklessness. It is the aim at authentic and whole existence. My death, of course, is the ultimate Whereunto which gives my Dasein meaning in every moment of its factical existence.

The Self as Being-in-the-World

[Dasein] finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of.

There are other features of the Heideggerian account of persons that allow us to connect this account with the accounts of "world"-traveler selves discussed above: the rejection of the subject-object dichotomy, the hermeneutic nature of the Heideggerian investigation, and the description of Dasein as a social, historical being. Although providing a detailed, in-depth account of these features is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to offer a brief explanation of them to show important similarities between the "world"-traveler self and the self conceived as Dasein, as being-in-the-world.

As stated above, Heidegger rejects the notion of a substantial core and, instead, believes that a human being is a being-in-the-world that defines itself by its involvement in the world. A very important aspect of this account of Dasein is that given the interrelatedness between human beings and the world (which is here conceived as where Dasein "dwells" rather than a sum or aggregate of objects), there is no longer a divide between subject and object. Heidegger attacks the dichotomy between the subject and object, the inner and the outer, because, in his view, this dichotomy does not accurately explain the human being's way of existing in the world. It is part of an account that mistakenly construes the self as a thinking substance and that leads to the infamous and tiresome problems of the existence of the external world and other minds. Consequently, it is one of Heidegger's main targets in the "Existential Analytic." Dasein, as a being-in-the-world, always has a world and has what Heidegger calls Mitsein, or being-with . Furthermore, given that Dasein is being-in-the-world, it no longer has a primarily epistemic relationship to the world; it no longer needs to go out to the world in order to capture representations of this world which are then to be put in the "'cabinet' of consciousness". Rather, being-in-the-world has non-reflective understanding, or know-how.

For Heidegger, not only are humans dependent on their context, but context itself is dependent on us. In other words, there is a hermeneutic or interpretative dimension to our existence; we are always involved in a hermeneutic circle.17 One way in which Heidegger illustrates this point is by explaining the activity of questioning and pointing out that whenever we ask a question, we are being guided beforehand by the answer (see 1962, sec. 1-4). This does not mean that whenever we ask the question we already know the answer explicitly; if this were the case there would be no point in asking the question. Rather, what Heidegger is explaining is that whenever we are in a position to ask a question--even when we think we have no clue about the answer--we already have an understanding of the context, even if it is only a vague understanding. This hermeneutic nature of existence is, for Heidegger, an unavoidable fact for a being that does not have an essence in the sense of a substantial core but has to define itself by its activity in the world. Dasein as a being-in-the-world, then, is always situated in a particular context, a context that allows it to form interpretations. This context which this self inhabits, however, is not itself fixed; it is also a matter of interpretation, depending on the particular self's experiences. In other words, Dasein might have experiences that lead it to revise its previously held interpretation of itself or of its surroundings. Again, if we consider Lugones's account of "world"-traveling in this Heideggerian context, it can be said that given experiences of "world"-traveling, Dasein might be able to reinterpret its "world."

Finally, an important characteristic of human beings as described in the Heideggerian "Existential Analytic" is the fact that we are historical beings. To say that we are historical beings might not at first glance seem like an interesting or original feature of the Heideggerian account until one understands the special sense of being historical described in the "Existential Analytic." For Heidegger, history is not simply the recording of facts, or historiography.18 Our being historical does not amount to keeping a record of all the events of our lives, or writing our biographies; rather, it has to do with the fact that our life is a process or a temporal "happening." I am a historical being in virtue of my being a temporal being. Given Heidegger's view of temporality as a phenomenon that involves the interrelatedness of the past, the present, and the future, rather than just a sequence of "nows," what I do in the present is connected to what I have done in the past as well as related to my future.This is the case when considering both my personal history as well as the history that I share with others from my culture.

Heidegger critiques the Aristotelian account of time as a "sequence of 'nows'" and provides a re-description of "human" time as "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been". In other words, time is not such that it is only present "now," and this "now" then no longer exists. Our present involves the past and the future. For example, I am writing an essay on philosophy now because I have always been interested in philosophy and hope to get better at writing and expressing my philosophical ideas in the future. I may also participate in a political rally now, because there is a history of oppression in my country, and I want to do something so that this oppression will not continue in the future. For Heidegger, then, Dasein's being historical involves being temporal in this way; our life is always related to a past (my past as well as my shared past), a past that is not just a list of events that have happened to us but a past in which we have lived these events in such a way that they are constitutive for our present as well as our future.

Thus, as we have seen in this section, the "Existential Analytic" provides a description of human beings in which we are not subjects standing against objects in the world; we are social beings dependent on the norms and practices of our culture; we are capable of re-interpreting our existences as well as these norms and practices; and we are historical, temporal beings who will always have a relationship to our past as well as our future. Importantly, some of these characteristics are features that the Heideggerian phenomenological account of self also shares with the more contemporary accounts provided by Latina feminists.

conclusions

Heidegger unifies the duality of modern philosophy. Subject and object (world) belong together in the single entity Dasein. Subject and object are not two beings, because they are the basic determination of Dasein in the unity of the characteristic of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger turns around Descartes' Cogito Sum, and he holds that "Sum" must be asserted first. He formulates "I am-in-the-world" as an understanding of Being: In this sense, Dasein is not a cogito. Dasein and its world can never be separated. Dasein is the Being-in-the-world. Therefore, "I am-in-the-world" precedes the "cogito sum." The truth of cogito is replaced in the disclosedness of Being which is basically primordial truth. Unlike Descartes and others, he breaks the chain of the tradition in terms of an understanding of world. His understanding of Being is Being-in-the-world, but the world of the Being of Dasein is not the physical world. It is the world of Dasein. The world of Dasein belongs to it , and it is a subjective.

The affirmation of our existence is the assertion that “man is not a thing”, and that our being is more than what is encountered everyday in the world. We are constantly under the overcast of Nothingness and, in the face of this, we are able to see our own possibilities because we do indeed exist. The experience of Nothingness can be followed through to an authentic existence if we do not brush it off as a merely fearful moment of some sort. Rather, this Nothingness is what allows us to realize our freedom as finite Being-toward-death, and we are then freed from the world in order that we may be freed for the world and to exist in it as fully and authentically as possible.